The Illusion of Identical Returns: Why Index Fund Labels Can Be Misleading

rifanmuazin - Saturday, November 21, 2026 | 16:08
Finance Poetry
The Illusion of Identical Returns: Why Index Fund Labels Can Be Misleading

In a recent Wall Street Journal “Intelligent Investor” column, financial journalist Jason Zweig highlighted a growing frustration among retail and institutional investors alike: the realization that index funds marketed as near-identical twins are, in practice, performing like complete strangers. This phenomenon, where two funds tracking ostensibly similar market segments diverge wildly in their returns, is not a market anomaly. Rather, it is a direct result of the complex, often opaque methodologies that underpin the index industry.

The disparity in performance is stark. As of mid-year, the iShares Russell 1000 Growth ETF had posted a modest gain of approximately 4.6% for the year, while the Invesco S&P 500 Pure Growth ETF had surged by 24.3%. Even among large-cap value ETFs, the performance spread between funds that theoretically track the same segment of the market reached as high as 11 percentage points.

Much of this divergence can be attributed to the nuances of index classification. For instance, tech companies like Micron Technology and SanDisk, which have been significant beneficiaries of the artificial intelligence boom, were long categorized as "value" stocks under the Russell index’s price-to-book methodology. This is because their asset-heavy balance sheets—laden with factories and specialized equipment—artificially inflated their book value, masking their high-growth potential. FTSE Russell eventually moved these firms into the growth category during a June reshuffle, but not before they drove roughly a fifth of the Russell 1000 Value Index’s return. As Zweig astutely warned, the finer and more specific the market is sliced and diced, the more concentrated and volatile the resulting index becomes.

Having spent decades designing index methodologies and performing due diligence on the benchmarks that underpin billions of dollars in investment products, I have seen this dynamic unfold firsthand. During my tenure at S&P Dow Jones Indices, where I oversaw U.S. equities—including the "pure" style family behind the Invesco fund mentioned earlier—I learned that the gap between a fund’s name and its actual performance is almost always found in the fine print of its methodology. The methodology serves as the DNA of the fund; it defines what the label actually means. Yet, for the vast majority of investors, the research process ends at the fund’s name.

The word "pure" in a fund’s title is a prime example of a marketing term that obscures a complex mechanical construction. A traditional style index, such as the S&P 500 Growth, typically holds every stock that exhibits growth characteristics—even those that might also possess value traits—and weights these holdings by market capitalization. The result is a fund that behaves like a mildly tilted version of the broader market. In contrast, a "pure" version of that index is designed to exclude the "blended middle," removing stocks that score as both growth and value. It retains only the companies with the strongest growth scores and weights them according to that score rather than by their market size. This elevates the most growth-centric companies to the top of the portfolio. Investors who take the time to read the two distinct methodologies should rightfully expect them to move differently, yet this construction difference is frequently overlooked. Furthermore, investors often miss instances where a fund’s prospectus allows for a benchmark swap while the marketing name remains unchanged.

"Label drift" is a recurring challenge in the index business. I experienced this transition firsthand in 2018 when S&P Dow Jones Indices and MSCI overhauled their sector maps—a project I helped lead. At that time, the Telecommunications sector was a collection of sleepy, high-dividend legacy companies comprising about 2% of the S&P 500. The transition into the new "Communication Services" sector added heavyweights like Alphabet, Facebook (now Meta), Netflix, and Disney, instantly ballooning the sector to roughly 10% of the market. Investors who had purchased a telecom fund for defensive income suddenly found themselves holding a high-growth, high-beta tech portfolio. Whether the change comes from a top-down reclassification or from the bottom-up evolution of a company’s business model—as seen with Micron’s shift from a factory-heavy value play to an AI-fueled growth trade—the end result is the same: the fund’s label remains constant, but the underlying exposure shifts dramatically.

Digital assets have represented an extreme version of this classification challenge. Before I established the first classification standards for digital assets at CoinDesk, there was no consistent, industry-wide framework to distinguish between a smart contract platform, a payment token, or a meme coin. It is impossible to conduct effective due diligence on an exposure that has not been clearly defined or categorized.

This same rigor is essential when an index attempts to turn a specific investment theme into an investable universe. For a sector like the space economy, revenue serves as a vital litmus test to determine whether a company’s business is truly tied to space activities or if its involvement is merely incidental. In a recent paper for Syntax Data, I analyzed the Syntax Space Industry Index, which mandates that a company must generate at least 50% of its revenue from space-related activities while also passing stringent liquidity and tradability screens. The 16 U.S.-listed companies in this index average roughly 95% exposure to space revenue, with 12 of them having 100% exposure.

When compared to the broader S&P Aerospace & Defense Select Industry Index—which averages only about 15% space revenue—or the S&P Kensho Final Frontiers Index, which averages roughly 22%, the differences are profound. These three indexes, though they carry similar titles, produce vastly different portfolios with distinct return drivers and risk profiles.

Zweig’s warning remains highly relevant here: anyone marketing a thematic index must be transparent about the resulting concentration. A strict revenue screen, while precise, left the space index with only 16 companies. While equal weighting helps limit the dominance of any single firm or the impact of a specific launch failure, the index’s modeled history showed annualized volatility near 70% and a peak-to-trough decline of nearly 49%. This is more than double the volatility of broader market benchmarks, suggesting that such funds are best suited as modest "satellite" allocations rather than core holdings, sized specifically to withstand severe drawdowns.

Timing is another element of methodology that investors often ignore. When a stock enters an index is a calculated decision that can significantly impact performance, particularly in fast-moving sectors. Invesco’s pure-growth fund benefited from its December rebalance, which swept in the right stocks at exactly the right moment to capture the chip rally. The recent public listing of SpaceX provided a masterclass in how different rules produce different outcomes. The space index I analyzed added the company effective June 15 at its first-day close, following a provision for IPOs with a market cap exceeding $250 billion and sufficient space-related revenue. Other indexes had different timelines: one added it a day later, FTSE Russell waited for its late-June reconstitution, the Nasdaq-100 waited for 15 trading days, and the S&P 500 requires a full year of trading history. Every one of these rules was published in advance, yet the timing difference led to significant variance in entry price and short-term performance.

Before purchasing an index fund, investors should read enough of the methodology to understand the fundamental criteria: what qualifies a stock for inclusion, how the constituents are weighted, what mechanisms prevent one stock from dominating the portfolio, when the index reconstitutes, and whether the performance history is live or backtested. For thematic funds, it is critical to determine whether eligibility rests on a broad, subjective label or a measurable, objective threshold like revenue. If the documentation cannot answer these questions in a page or two, investors are being asked to rely too heavily on a name that may be misleading.

Zweig concludes by questioning the necessity of dividing the market into growth and value at all, noting that holding broad growth and value funds together can largely recreate the market itself. "Pure" style indices, however, create a very different animal. By excluding the blended middle and weighting stocks by the strength of their style characteristics, these funds create portfolios that emphasize extreme positions. The same relationship between purity and concentration applies to thematic indices. As eligibility rules narrow, the portfolio becomes more concentrated, fundamentally changing the risks the investor assumes. Owning a thematic fund is, in essence, a commitment to both the intended exposure and the unique volatility profile that the narrower, more concentrated portfolio creates.

Jodie Gunzberg, CFA, is managing partner of InFi Strategies, an independent advisory practice serving asset managers, index providers, and wealth advisors on investment strategy, product commercialization, and index design.

Source : Finance Poetry
Author : rifanmuazin
Editor : Finance Poetry Editorial Team